A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules by Peter Cramton & Robert Wilson
A Review of ISO New England’s Proposed Market Rules 
 
Peter Cramton and Robert Wilson
1 
Market Design Inc. 
 
September 9, 1998 
Executive Summary 
This report reviews the proposed rules for restructured wholesale electricity markets in New 
England. We review the market rules, both individually and collectively, and identify potential problems 
that might limit the efficiency of these markets. We examine alternatives and identify the key tradeoffs 
among alternative designs. We focus primarily on questions raised in our Scope of Work. 
We believe that the wholesale electricity market in New England can begin on December 1, 1998. 
However, improvements are needed for long-run success. We have identified four major 
recommendations: 
  Switch to a multi-settlement system. 
  Introduce demand-side bidding. 
  Adopt location-based transmission congestion pricing, especially for the import/export 
interfaces. 
  Fix the pricing of the ten minute spinning reserves. 
Of these, only the final (and least important) recommendation realistically could be implemented by 
the December 1
st start date. We do not view this as a fatal problem, provided that by the start date the ISO 
and NEPOOL reach agreement in principle on these basic concepts and a tentative timetable for 
implementation. We believe that if the markets open without any sense of what improvements will be 
made or when they will be made, then it will be much more difficult to adopt and implement needed 
improvements. An evolutionary “wait and see” approach would be too slow, and likely would result in 
damage to the markets that is difficult to correct. 
Our analysis is broad and abstracts from many of the details of implementation. Because of the level 
of abstraction, our recommendations must be viewed as tentative. It will be important for ISO New 
England to monitor closely the markets in the early months to identify and correct problems as they 
appear. 
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Our recommendations stem from the following critique of the proposed market rules: 
♦  The single-settlement system is vulnerable.  
The single-settlement system creates strong incentives to manipulate the spot price and reschedule. 
This is easy for participants to do through short-notice imports/exports and scheduling changes. There 
is sufficient market power in New England to make it likely that spot price manipulation will be 
significant. The absence of congestion pricing allows exploitation of imports/exports and other means 
as the device. This is complicated by inconsistencies with neighboring jurisdictions’ methods of 
managing transmission congestion, and further complicated by arcane rules for determining the spot 
price (reliance on forward-rolling LPs or other methods, none of which recognize the full value of 
flexible resources). We expect the ISO to encounter severe problems trying to establish reliable, 
stable, feasible scheduling—the parties will manipulate schedules essentially every day and every 
hour, and try constantly to use short-notice imports/exports with NY/Quebec to the extent 
transmission allows. 
♦  The spot-price system is problematic.  
The 5-min LP optimization, in terms of treatment of intertemporal constraints and allowance for 
forecast errors and other contingencies, is fundamentally inconsistent with the day-ahead 
optimization. Participants are not being paid real-time for the commitments made day-ahead, and 
peak prices are biased too low, which disadvantages flexible resources. The absence of demand-side 
bidding both day-ahead and spot makes the spot price biased upward. 
♦  The absence of location-based congestion pricing is inefficient.  
The absence of transmission congestion pricing, especially for imports/exports, is fundamentally 
inefficient, and likely to engender ferocious arbitrage and manipulation vis-a-vis NY/Quebec/New 
Brunswick. Paying out-of-merit-order generators their bids invites gaming. It is better to pay them 
and every one else in a congestion zone the marginal bid that is scheduled. The proposed pricing will 
induce manipulation of day-ahead supply functions in a game to garner constrained on/off payments. 
Moreover, the current rules fail to provide the correct incentives for the location of new generation. 
♦  The viability of the day-ahead energy market is not obvious.  
The existing structure encourages self-scheduled bilateral contracts to take over the New England 
energy market for forward transactions, leaving the ISO to manage real-time balancing and reserves. 
We are concerned that if the ISO energy market has a tiny share of the total market then physical 
feasibility will be more precarious, real-time balancing will be more difficult, and the spot price will 
be more volatile. This will have a negative impact on the efficiency of bilateral contracting and the Cramton and Wilson   Review of Market Rules 
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electricity market as a whole. The physical feasibility of self-scheduled bilateral transactions is 
problematic, in part because the incentives encourage reliance on the ISO to remedy difficulties in the 
real-time market. 
We list our recommendations (four main recommendations and four secondary recommendations) 
roughly in order of importance. 
1.  ISO New England should switch to a multi-settlement system. Although it could not be implemented 
by December 1, its implementation is helped by the fact that the neighboring power markets in PJM 
and NY have adopted a multi-settlement system. We recommend either a two-settlement system with 
financially binding day-ahead bids, or a three-settlement system with binding bids both day-ahead 
and hour-ahead. Such an approach provides market incentives for participants to respond efficiently 
to uncertain demand and supply. Deviations from day-ahead schedules are priced by the market. 
Moreover, it mitigates incentives for gaming and reduces bidder uncertainty. Adopting a multi-
settlement system would eliminate the inherent gaming problems that short-notice transactions create. 
Multiple settlements, self-scheduling, and day-ahead commitments are natural organizational 
complements that cannot be implemented piecemeal. 
2.  Demand-side bidding should be introduced as soon as possible. The ISO should develop the rules and 
other steps needed for implementation, taking advantage of the experience of other markets such as 
California. Demand-side bidding will mitigate supplier market power and provide incentives for 
power management. Demand-side bidding is essential for long-run efficiency. 
3.  The uniform uplift approach to transmission congestion is unlikely to be adequate. The ISO should 
begin investigating alternatives. Location-based pricing will increase short-run efficiency, especially 
regarding imports/exports used to arbitrage prices between New England and neighboring 
jurisdictions, and provide improved incentives for generation and transmission siting and expansion. 
Also it will improve the stability of the spot price. 
4.  The pricing of spinning reserves should be greatly simplified. At the very least, the double-counting 
should be eliminated. A preferred approach would be to let all capable resources bid for TMSR and 
other reserves in a cascade.  
5.  The risk of implicit collusion is sufficiently large to outweigh the efficiency gains of disclosing 
information beyond market prices and total quantities. The ISO should have in place before the 
market opens a plan to analyze the bidding data on a continuing basis for signs of the use of market 
power. 
6.  The ISO and NEPOOL should consider eliminating the installed capability market and the operable 
capability market. In the long run, incentives for sufficient capacity are provided by the energy and Cramton and Wilson   Review of Market Rules 
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reserve markets. If the installed capability market is retained, it may be desirable to allow iterative 
bidding. The installed capability market does not appear to be an effective deterrent to over-expansion 
of capacity, and the operable capability market appears ineffective in avoiding gaming of 
maintenance schedules. 
7.  Only pure energy bids are needed for efficiency in the energy market. The inclusion of start-up and 
no-load components, while sensible in a centrally optimized system, are prone to gaming in a 
decentralized bidding environment. Bidders should be able to self-schedule their units reliably 
through pure energy bids, especially under a multi-settlement system. 
8.  Iterative bidding in the energy market is probably unnecessary, especially if the ISO switches to a 
three-settlement system. Then the bidders will have an opportunity to correct scheduling deficiencies 
in the hour-ahead and spot markets. 
1 Introduction 
This report reviews the proposed rules for restructured wholesale electricity markets in New 
England. The markets are auction markets. We review the auction designs, both individually and 
collectively, and identify potential problems that might limit the efficiency of these markets. We examine 
alternatives and identify the key tradeoffs among alternative designs. We conclude the report with several 
recommendations. Most of these are long-term recommendations, in the sense that they could not be 
implemented before the December 1
st start date. 
Our analysis is broad and abstracts from many of the details of implementation. This approach is 
required due to the tight time constraints. Also, we believe it is the best approach as ISO New England 
plans for the initiation and future development of a competitive electricity market. However, because of 
the level of abstraction, our recommendations must be viewed as tentative. Some of the recommendations 
undoubtedly will change as we learn more about competitive electricity markets, and the New England 
market in particular. Moreover, there certainly will be implementation problems that we are unable to 
anticipate. Thus, it will be important for ISO New England to monitor closely the markets in the early 
months to identify and correct problems as they appear.
2 
The issues that we address here concern the organization of the wholesale markets for energy and 
transmission, interpreted as including ancillary services and other requirements for system reliability and 
security. The examination of these issues in New England can benefit from the history of restructuring in 
other countries, such as Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Canada, and current 
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developments in the U.S., especially California, New York, and PJM. We emphasize the implications of 
the general principles of market design based on ideas from economics and game theory. 
The special features of the electricity industry that must be considered include temporal and 
stochastic variability of demands and supplies, accentuated by the non-storability of power, multiple 
technologies with varying sensitivities to capital and fuel costs and environmental and siting restrictions, 
and dependence on a reliable and secure transmission system. The economic problems include substantial 
non-convexities (immobility of generation and transmission facilities, scale economies in generation, non-
linearities in transmission), and externalities (mainly in transmission). As regards generation these 
problems have eased sufficiently in recent decades to enable competitive energy markets, but they remain 
important considerations in designing these markets. 
The criteria for selecting among market designs include efficiency over the long term, including 
incentives for investment in facilities for generation and transmission. However, our exposition focuses 
on short-term efficiency, since this is the immediate concrete problem, and it is required for long-term 
efficiency. 
Our perspective emphasizes strategic behavior. This seems paradoxical, since our aim is to construct 
a design that suppresses gaming or renders it ineffective in favor of greater efficiency. The principle, 
however, is to treat the market design as establishing a mode of competition among the traders. The key is 
to select a mode of competition that is most effective in realizing the potential gains from trade. 
We begin in Section 2 with a brief description of the ISO-managed markets in New England, the 
likely market structure when operations begin, and the properties of efficient market rules. The 
subsequent sections address the topics specified in our Scope of Work. Sections 3-6 discuss four major 
issues that the rules must address: the settlement system, transmission congestion, the interaction between 
the energy and the reserve markets, and revelation of bidding information. Sections 7-9 address issues in 
the specific markets. Section 10 concludes with a recap of our perspective. 
2 Background 
2.1  Description of the ISO’s Markets 
Seven markets are proposed: (1) the energy market, (2-5) four markets for ancillary services, and (6-
7) two capacity markets. A brief description of each is given below. 
1.  The energy market is a residual market. Only the difference between a participant’s energy 
resources and its energy obligations is traded in the ISO market. These resources and obligations 
include amounts covered by bilateral contracts. Hourly bids, expressed in $/MWh, are submitted Cramton and Wilson   Review of Market Rules 
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on a day-ahead basis for the next 24 hours. The ISO then schedules the generating units that will 
run the following day based on minimizing total costs in the energy market, as represented by the 
accepted bids. The market is settled after the fact on an hourly basis. All transactions are priced at 
the (ex post) energy clearing price. Payments/receipts are equal to the MWh bought/sold times 
the clearing price. Suppliers are paid for out-of-merit-order dispatch to alleviate transmission 
congestion on the basis of their bids submitted in the energy market.
3 
2.  The ten minute spinning reserve (TMSR) market is a full requirements market. All TMSR is 
bought/sold through the ISO. Bidding and settlement are done as in the energy market—hourly 
bids in $/MW for the next day are submitted, and the markets are settled hourly after the fact. 
Given the units dispatched to provide energy, the ISO selects the least-cost resources to provide 
required TMSR, taking into account bid costs, lost opportunity costs, and production cost 
changes. When the market begins operation, only hydro units and dispatchable loads may bid into 
this market. Although they cannot bid, fossil-fueled generators can be selected to participate in 
the market based on lost opportunity costs and production cost changes. Designated resources are 
paid the energy clearing price for any MWh provided plus lost opportunity cost plus production 
cost changes plus the bid times the MW provided. The total cost of providing TMSR is shared 
proportionally by load. 
3.  The ten minute non-spinning reserve (TMNSR) market is a full requirements market. All 
TMNSR is bought/sold through the ISO. Bidding and settlement are done as in the energy 
market—hourly bids in $/MW for the next day are submitted, and the markets are settled hourly 
after the fact. Designated resources are paid the clearing price times the MW provided as 
reserved capacity. The total cost of providing TMNSR is shared proportionally by load. 
4.  The thirty minute operating reserve (TMOR) market is a full requirements market. All TMOR is 
bought/sold through the ISO. Bidding and settlement are done as in the energy market—hourly 
bids in $/MW for the next day are submitted, and the markets are settled hourly after the fact. 
Designated resources are paid the clearing price times the MW provided. The total cost of 
providing TMOR is shared proportionally by load. 
5.  The automatic generation control (AGC) market is a full requirements market. All AGC is 
bought/sold through the ISO. Bidding and settlement are done as in the energy market—hourly 
bids for the next day are submitted, and the markets are settled hourly after the fact. AGC is 
measured in regs, which measures a unit’s ability to follow load. Units that can provide AGC at 
lowest cost based on bids, lost opportunity costs, and production cost changes are selected. 
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Generators providing AGC are paid the clearing price for time on AGC times the number of regs 
plus a payment for AGC service actually provided plus any lost opportunity cost. The total cost 
of providing AGC is shared proportionally by load. 
6.  The operable capability market is a residual market. Only the difference between a participant’s 
operable capability resources and its operating capability obligation (load plus operating reserve) 
is traded through the ISO. Bidding and settlement are done as in the energy market—hourly bids 
in $/MW for the next day are submitted, and the markets are settled hourly after the fact. A 
clearing price is calculated based on the bids of those participants with excess operable capacity. 
Participants who are deficient in operable capability pay the clearing price for each MW to those 
who are in surplus and who bid a price less than or equal to the clearing price. 
7.  The installed capability market is a residual market. Only the difference between a participant’s 
installed capability resources and its installed capability obligation (load plus installed operating 
reserve) is traded through the ISO. Trading in this market occurs monthly. Bids are submitted in 
$/MW-month on the last day before the month begins. A clearing price is calculated based on the 
bids of those participants with excess installed capacity. Participants who are deficient in 
installed capability pay the clearing price for each MW-month to those who are in surplus and 
who bid a price less than or equal to the clearing price. FERC currently has a cap of $8,750/MW-
month. 
The energy and reserve markets (1-5) represent the core of the system; there is no separate market 
for transmission. These markets cannot be viewed in isolation, as each interacts with the others. In what 
follows, we examine the markets as a system, recognizing any interdependencies. 
2.2  Market Structure in New England 
Full efficiency requires competitive markets—markets in which no single participant can 
significantly influence prices. Due to economies of scale and transmission constraints, electricity markets 
are unlikely to achieve the ideal of perfect competition. Some parties will have some market power in at 
least some local markets (load pockets), a feature reinforced by payment of bids for out-of-merit dispatch 
to alleviate congestion.
4 As a result, the electricity market structure in New England will be relevant in 
assessing the market rules, and determining how robust the rules are to the reality of market power. 
Recommendations will depend in part on the extent of market power. 
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There are three interdependent determinants of market power: market shares, transmission 
congestion, and market contestability. For the most part, we will assume here that transmission 
congestion is not a problem in New England. Transmission congestion will be addressed separately in 
Section 4. 
Our discussion of market structure is based on the market shares of generation in New England as it 
is likely to be at the time the markets begin operation. Assuming transmission congestion is not a 
problem, market power is likely to be an issue only with respect to the two largest participants, NU and 
PGET. These two bidders have over 50% of the market’s bidding authority and operating authority, 
ignoring imports. Because of joint ownership of some units, NU and PGET have knowledge of, and 
influence on, an even larger share of the market. In our mind, these market shares may be a cause for 
concern. Also, market power may be a more important issue if transmission congestion is a problem in 
some locations at peak times. 
In evaluating market power in the various auction markets, one should look at the market shares 
conditional on a unit’s ability to participate in the relevant market. For example, only hydro units and 
dispatchable loads can bid into the TMSR market; only units capable of providing AGC can participate in 
the AGC market. In addition, baseload units at the bottom of the supply curve, such as nuclear units or 
other units with low operating costs that are unlikely to set the clearing price at peak times, can be 
excluded from the market share calculations. What is relevant in evaluating market power is the shape of 
the supply curve around the market clearing price; that is, the elasticity of supply at the margin, especially 
in peak periods. If the supply curve is steep, then the larger bidders, will be able to influence the clearing 
price, and will have a strong incentive to reduce the quantity offered to achieve a higher clearing price.
5  
Specific recommendations on market power mitigation are presented in Section 6. 
2.3  Properties of Efficient Market Rules 
In evaluating the market design, we take the objective to be to promote an efficient market for 
wholesale electricity in New England. We now discuss several key properties of efficient market rules. 
♦  Do the rules send the right price signals? 
The pricing rules are critical in assessing efficiency in markets. Prices provide the incentives that 
influence behavior. For full efficiency, prices should reflect the marginal costs of suppliers and the 
marginal values of demanders. 
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♦  Do the rules minimize opportunities for gaming?  
Gaming arises from several sources. Incorrect price signals give bidders a direct incentive to act in a 
way contrary to efficiency. Market power enables large bidders to distort prices in their favor. Non-
binding bids, unpenalized scheduling changes, and weak monitoring and enforcement of compliance, 
encourage misrepresentation. 
♦  Do the rules enable markets to be contested? 
Contestable markets discipline incumbents via the threat of entry. To the extent that entry is swift and 
costless, incumbents are unable to exercise market power. Efficient rules encourage entry. Rules with 
low bidding costs and few bidding restrictions encourage entry. Simple and transparent rules are often 
best since they tend to minimize the cost of participation. Such rules encourage participation by small 
bidders and entrants that can undermine attempts by large incumbents to exercise market power. 
♦  Are the rules neutral with respect to bilateral transactions? 
Efficient rules let the bidders decide how best to participate in the market. Bilateral transactions are 
neither encouraged nor discouraged. Innovative and customized long-term contracts enable 
realization of mutual advantages that are not priced explicitly in the general markets. 
♦  Do the rules mitigate opportunities for collusive behavior? 
The essential ingredients to mitigate collusive behavior are: (1) to limit market power, (2) to 
encourage entry, and (3) to limit participants’ ability to coordinate and enforce collusive outcomes. 
We use these criteria as guides in our examination of the New England market structure. 
3 Alternative  Settlement  Approaches 
A basic choice in any energy market is the settlement system. NEPOOL has proposed a single-
settlement system. Others have adopted a multi-settlement system. We discuss the issues in both below. 
3.1 Single-settlement  system 
In a single-settlement system, the day-ahead bids are used for scheduling, but prices are determined 
ex post based on real-time dispatch. A single-settlement system consists of the following steps: 
  Bids and schedules are submitted day-ahead. 
  ISO schedules units for the next day to minimize costs, given the bids, forecasts, operating and 
transmission constraints, and bilateral schedules. 
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  ISO may accept bid/schedule changes up to an hour before real time. 
  ISO dispatches units in real time at least cost, given the bids and forecasts for subsequent hours. 
  ISO determines real-time spot prices as shadow prices from the actual real-time LP optimization 
of dispatch. 
  Real-time spot prices are used for all settlements to pay generators and charge load. 
  Compliance penalties are assessed against those failing to perform as scheduled. 
3.2 Multi-settlement  system 
In a multi-settlement system, the day-ahead bids are used for both scheduling and settling day-ahead 
transactions. Only deviations from the day-ahead schedule are priced ex post. The steps are as follows: 
  Bids and bilateral schedules are submitted day-ahead. 
  ISO schedules dispatchable units for the next day to minimize costs, given the bids, bilateral 
schedules, and forecasts. 
  ISO determines the prices associated with the day-ahead schedule as shadow prices obtained 
from the day-ahead LP optimization. 
  The day-ahead prices and scheduled quantities are used in the first settlement. 
  ISO may accept bid/schedule changes up to an hour before real time. 
  ISO dispatches units in real time at least cost, given the bids, schedules, and forecasts for 
subsequent hours. 
  ISO determines real-time spot prices from the actual dispatch. 
  Deviations from day-ahead schedules are settled at the real-time spot prices (second settlement). 
A three-settlement system is the same, but with an hour-ahead settlement for deviations from the 
day-ahead schedules, and then a real-time settlement for deviations from the hour-ahead schedules. 
To illustrate how the bidding in a multi-settlement system works consider the energy market with 
demand-side bidding and unconstrained transmission. One day ahead, suppliers submit supply bids and 
demanders submit demand bids for energy for each hour and each location. Participants submitting 
bilateral schedules indicate the amounts to be injected and withdrawn at each location in each hour. From 
these bids, the ISO constructs the aggregate supply and demand curves, and identifies the market clearing 
price. Supply bids below the clearing price and demand bids above the clearing price are scheduled. 
These bids are financially binding. 
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In the subsequent hour-ahead and/or real-time market, deviations from this schedule are remedied 
using adjustment bids; that is, incremental or decremental bids that indicate the prices at which the 
supplier (demander) would be willing to increase or decrease its injections (withdrawals). These “incs” 
and “decs,” depending on the design, may be voluntary or mandatory, and in the latter case may be 
deemed to be the same as the original bids. 
The purpose of the incs and decs, however obtained, can be seen in an example. Suppose that a 
generator fails to deliver. The incs and decs are used to identify the suppliers that are best able to adjust 
their supplies to balance the market. In this way adjustments are made at least cost. Moreover, deviations 
from the day ahead schedule are properly priced. If a generator fails to deliver, then other generators will 
be increased (according to the incs bid), pushing up the spot price. The generator pays a penalty equal to 
the difference between the spot price and the day-ahead price times the quantity the generator failed to 
deliver. 
3.3  Is a single-settlement system sufficient? 
The single-settlement system may appear simpler than multi-settlement systems. First, it involves 
just a single set of hourly prices. Second, it is closer to the way NEPOOL operated before restructuring. 
However, this simplicity is deceptive. The difficulty with the single ex post settlement is that much is 
riding on the ex post prices, since all earlier commitments and transactions are settled at the prices 
established in real time. After the day-ahead schedule is formed, bidders have an incentive to make 
adjustments to influence the spot price in a favorable direction. Since the spot price is used for all trades, 
the incentive for manipulation may be large.
6 For instance, day-ahead transactions including bilateral 
transactions may account for 95% of trades, but these are settled at prices that reflect heavily the 5% 
traded in the real-time market. Bidders can take advantage of short-term inelasticities in the supply 
schedule to reap excess profits. Knowing how to do this is complex, and can be exploited best by large 
bidders with sufficient scale to make the efforts worthwhile. The added complexity and risk tends to 
discourage entry and participation by small bidders whose net revenue might be whipsawed by price 
volatility in the real-time market. 
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This gaming can be mitigated by financial penalties for failures to perform as scheduled. But then the 
question is: How to set the penalties? Some flexibility is needed because of uncertainties in demand and 
supply. Setting the penalties too high leads to inefficient responses to this uncertainty, and setting the 
penalties too low leads to excessive gaming. The reliance on penalties is highly inefficient and 
problematic in its workings. It is a carryover from the tight power pool of NEPOOL, and is unworkable 
on a sustained basis in a competitive market. The whole idea of relying on administered penalties is 
inefficient, subject to disputes between NEPOOL and ISO New England, and subject to continual 
pressure (as in Alberta) to seek modifications and exceptions. Compliance is shown to be a problem in 
Victoria, where a supplier can and does curtail generation by claiming an operating problem, etc. 
A multi-settlement system mitigates gaming on two fronts. First, the day-ahead bids are binding 
financial commitments. The bids and resulting schedules are credible precisely because they are 
financially binding. Second, bidders are unable to alter the day-ahead prices. These remain fixed for all 
transactions scheduled in the day-ahead market. Deviations from the day-ahead schedule affect the spot 
price, but the spot price is used only to price these deviations. Hence, in a multi-settlement system the 
incentive to manipulate the spot price is not magnified as it is in a single-settlement system. 
  Penalties for non-performance are not needed in a multi-settlement system, since deviations from the 
schedule are priced correctly. If a generator fails to deliver as scheduled, then that generator is liable for 
the spot price for the quantity it was supposed to deliver. 
  The multi-settlement system reduces risk for the bidders, since the bidders can lock in the day-ahead 
prices. For the ISO, the multi-settlement system reduces scheduling uncertainty because it discourages 
schedule changes, and it automatically sets the right penalties for non-performance. The system maintains 
the flexibility required to respond efficiently to fluctuations in demand and supply. 
  A difficulty with the multi-settlement system is that it involves multiple prices for energy. One might 
think that energy at a particular time (and place) should have one price. However, this is not correct. The 
price should be determined at the time resources are committed. Hence, if there are two commitment 
points (day-ahead based on forecasts and real-time based on events), then there should be two prices, one 
a forward price for early commitments and a second that recognizes the effects of contingencies. 
  Despite the advantages of multi-settlement systems, single-settlement systems can perform 
adequately for at least a short period of time. The United Kingdom, Victoria, and Alberta provide 
examples of such systems. However, there is a strong tendency to move away from single-settlement 
systems. The United Kingdom intends to switch to a multi-settlement system, as does PJM. Both 
California and New York use or will use multi-settlement systems. We believe that this shift toward 
multi-settlement systems reflects the significant advantages they offer. The use of single-settlement Cramton and Wilson   Review of Market Rules 
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systems in some markets is largely a historical artifact. Single-settlement systems are evolutionarily closer 
to the organization of power pools before competitive wholesale markets were introduced. 
The differing incentive effects of the alternative settlement systems are illustrated in the Alberta 
(single-settlement) and California (multi-settlement) designs. 
The design of the California PX may seem awkward at first, and indeed it is awkward in terms of the 
software required for settlements, since each MWh of energy might be assigned any one of several prices. 
In the PX’s energy market, one clearing price is financially binding for trades completed in the day-ahead 
forward market, another clearing price is binding in the hour-ahead forward market, and the spot price in 
real time applies to ancillary services and supplemental energy purchased by the ISO. On the other hand, 
the advantage of this design is that traders have an incentive to bid seriously in each of the forward 
markets, since the trades concluded there are financially binding at the clearing price in that market.  
Alberta uses the opposite design in which all settlements are made at the final spot price, calculated 
ex post. That this design produces incentive problems can be seen in the rules required to implement it. 
Traders were originally prohibited from altering their day-ahead commitments, but then pressures from 
suppliers led to a compromise in which each trader was allowed a single re-declaration, and lately the 
argument has been over whether the final time for all declarations should be moved to just two hours 
before dispatch. These developments reflect all suppliers’ preferences to delay commitments until close to 
the time at which prices for settlement are established, so that uncertainty is reduced, and each supplier’s 
advantage from committing last so that it can take maximal advantage of the likely pattern of prices 
thereby revealed. The Alberta design also invited a kind of gaming. Importers and exporters are allowed 
to submit multiple “virtual” declarations. They have used this opportunity to declare several alternatives 
on a day-ahead basis and then to withdraw all but one shortly before dispatch in order to obtain the best 
terms. Of course the other traders in Alberta now want the same privilege.  
Our opinion is that the difficulties implementing the Alberta design are intrinsic to any design in 
which transactions are not financially binding at the clearing price in the market in which they are made. 
Having the day-ahead bids clear at the spot price, rather than the day-ahead price, introduces a basic 
conflict. One can argue that a sequence of binding forward prices might sacrifice some efficiency in 
coordinating the day-ahead and real-time markets, as compared to one in which settlements are based 
only on spot prices, but our view is that this sacrifice is necessary to ensure that bids are serious in the 
forward markets. If viable forward markets are unnecessary, as perhaps in a purely hydro system, then 
spot-price settlements are sufficient, but it seems to us that justifications for forward markets also justify 
binding transactions at the clearing prices in these markets. One must, of course, ensure that the sequence Cramton and Wilson   Review of Market Rules 
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of forward markets is sufficiently contestable to enable arbitrage that keeps forward prices in line (in 
expectation) with subsequent spot prices. 
Recommendation: The ISO should switch to a multi-settlement system. We recommend either a two-
settlement system with financially binding day-ahead bids, or a three-settlement system with binding bids 
both day-ahead and hour-ahead. Such an approach provides market incentives for participants to 
respond efficiently to uncertain demand and supply. Moreover, it mitigates incentives for gaming and 
reduces bidder uncertainty. Deviations from day-ahead schedules are priced by the market. 
4 Transmission  Congestion 
A second key issue is how to handle transmission congestion. Ideally, there will be excess 
transmission capacity and congestion will be important only in exceptional circumstances. In this case, 
there is just one liquid and competitive electricity market. Energy prices vary by time but not by place. 
This optimistic view may fit the New England market, where the grid was designed as a single unified 
market. However, it is worth discussing congestion issues in the event transmission congestion becomes 
more of an issue after restructuring. Indeed, there is reason to believe that transmission congestion will 
become more of an issue after restructuring. In a market, suppliers will operate to maximize profits. 
Supplier profits may be enhanced by exploiting transmission congestion to create a local monopoly. For 
example, a supplier with multiple units may self-schedule them in such a way as to force a unit with a 
higher bid on line when it otherwise would not be dispatched. Hence, the fact that transmission 
congestion was not a problem in the past does not mean that it can be ignored in the future when suppliers 
face market incentives. In any case, it is clear that congestion is likely on the interties that enable imports 
and exports to adjacent control areas, since there will be strong incentives for arbitrage between the 
markets in neighboring jurisdictions.  
4.1 Uniform  uplift 
NEPOOL has proposed a uniform uplift charge to cover the costs of alleviating congestion, which is 
similar to its current practice. Uniform uplift works as follows. When transmission constraints are 
violated, units are selected out of merit order to solve the security-constrained problem at least cost. The 
out-of-merit units are paid their bids,
7 rather than the lower clearing price for energy or the higher 
clearing price for the marginal cost of adjustments invoked to eliminate congestion. The cost of these 
extra payments is recovered through a uniform uplift charge that all loads pay on a proportionate basis.
8 
                                                      
7 Provided the market structure and pricing constraints are satisfied; see footnote 3. 
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The uniform uplift approach is simple—all loads pay the same energy price. However, it does not 
send the correct market signals to demanders or suppliers. In a congested system, injections and 
withdrawals at different points in the network impose different costs or benefits on the system. Efficiency 
requires that the prices parties face reflect these differences. If one party’s additional demand for transfer 
creates transmission congestion, then it should pay the added costs of adjusting others’ generation; if 
another’s additional demand reduces transmission congestion, then it should reap the benefit of the 
reduced costs of adjustment. Locational pricing is one approach to solve this problem. It is described in 
the next subsection. 
The uniform uplift approach is vulnerable to bid manipulation. A supplier will submit a high bid in 
situations where it is likely it will be constrained on, and so receive its bid, rather than the clearing price. 
And a supplier may adjust other bids to increase the chances it will get the constrained-on payment for 
alleviating congestion. This distorts the energy market, since the same bids are used. The market 
monitoring rules that limit the situations in which a bidder is paid its bid mitigates the distortion. 
However, these administrative rules are ad hoc and inflexible. A market based response to the problem is 
better. 
Uniform uplift charges are especially problematic with respect to imports and exports. To the extent 
that there are price differences between New England and the New York, Quebec, and New Brunswick 
control areas, there is an incentive for imports or exports.
9 Uniform uplift may not allow the prices at the 
interconnections to balance, which typically requires that imports and exports must be rationed 
administratively using a pro forma tariff, rather than by markets. Administrative procedures may be slow 
to respond and distort incentives, and thus may undermine the contestability of the New England energy 
markets. They also create rents that attract strategic behaviors by participants designed to capture them, 
for example creating congestion to get units with higher bids to run. 
Uniform uplift charges suffice provided transmission congestion is not a significant issue. This will 
be true if uplift charges represent a tiny fraction of the energy cost. However, if the uplift becomes 
significant, then measures should be taken to adopt a market-based approach to transmission congestion. 
Since developing and implementing such measures will take considerable time and extensive regulatory 
approvals, the effort should begin at first sign that the uniform uplift approach may be inadequate. The 
import/export interfaces deserve continuing close scrutiny. 
                                                      
9 The Quebec interface, which will become available for market use in 2000 or 2001, will need to be treated 
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4.2 Location-based  pricing 
In its purest form, real-time congestion pricing of scarce transmission capacity sets a usage charge 
for each directional link in the system, or equivalently (using Kirchhoff’s Laws) an injection charge at 
each node. The choice between these is often based on practical considerations: there may be many more 
links than nodes, thereby favoring nodal pricing, but perhaps only a few links are congested recurrently, 
in which case link pricing is simpler.
10 More frequently, only a few major links or nodes are priced 
explicitly, and for forward markets it is sufficient to establish injection charges only for nodal hubs or for 
large zones, or usage charges for major zonal interfaces as in NordPool and California.
11 These practices 
have important implications for the specification of firm transmission rights (FTRs) and price hedges 
such as transmission congestion contracts (TCCs); for example, secondary markets are illiquid or inactive 
if the FTRs or TCCs are specified in point-to-point terms rather than zone-to-zone. In principle TCCs are 
required for every nodal or zonal pair but in practice it suffices to consider only those nominated by 
traders, and then issue a subset consistent with the system capacity and security constraints. Due to loop 
flow, a TCC can have a negative value and require the holder to pay rather than receive a usage charge; if 
this is impractical then the ISO must absorb the cost, whereas the prices of directional links are always 
nonnegative. 
In a competitive market, injection or usage charges are derived from the marginal costs of alleviating 
congestion, not a tariff or “postage stamp” based on embedded cost. In an optimized pool the usage 
charge represents the shadow price on transmission capacity, but in decentralized markets it represents the 
difference at the margin between the cost to the ISO of scheduling an increment (say, of supply in an 
import zone) and the revenue from a decrement (of supply in an export zone), or the reverse in the case of 
a demand inc/dec pair. For example, in a two-zone situation the usage charge for the zonal interface is 
typically the difference in terms of $/MWh between the most expensive increment in the import zone and 
the least profitable decrement in the export zone, among those scheduled by the ISO. When the 
configuration is more complicated the ISO uses an OPF or other optimization program to select the bids 
that are accepted, taking account of loop flow and security constraints. Congestion pricing in this fashion 
is based on the principle that the transmission system is an open-access public facility in which (non-
discriminatory) charges are imposed only to alleviate congestion on over-demanded interfaces, and 
                                                      
10 When only a few links have positive prices it is still true that nearly all nodes have nonzero injection charges. 
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represent the marginal costs of the re-scheduled resources. In particular, the owners of transmission assets 
cannot withhold capacity nor affect prices.
12  
A common implementation of locational pricing is locational marginal pricing (LMP). This approach 
has been adopted by PJM and New York. With LMP, a different price for energy is calculated at each 
node. These location-specific prices reflect the marginal cost of an additional MWh of energy at each 
node, taking into account all costs and benefits of the additional energy on the system. In the ISO New 
England system the LMP would be the location-specific shadow price for energy in the 5-minute dispatch 
LP. LMP sends the right price signals provided bilateral contracts also pay congestion charges equal to 
the difference in the LMPs at the two locations. Although locational marginal pricing may appear 
complex, the prices are easily calculated as part of the dispatch LP, and can easily be made available to 
participants on a five minute basis via an OASIS bulletin board. PJM’s experience with LMP in its first 
two months, April-May 1998, demonstrates that it can be implemented, even with thousands of nodes, 
and may be effective in shifting behavior in response to transmission congestion.
13 
Correctly pricing congestion can have substantial benefits in constrained systems. Most importantly, 
it gives the ISO a market-based means of satisfying security constraints. Participants react to the location-
specific prices in ways consistent with economically efficient dispatch subject to these constraints. The 
alternative of administrative controls is apt to be far less responsive or efficient. 
One difficulty with LMP or other location-specific pricing is that it exposes the participants to 
another source of price uncertainty. Most systems that have adopted location-specific pricing have 
proposed that tradable fixed transmission rights (FTRs) be issued for some fraction of capacity. These 
rights include insurance against usage charges in the form of a TCC, and sometimes also scheduling 
priority as in California. By acquiring FTRs, a participant obtains a financial hedge against the 
uncertainty of usage charges. An FTR from point A to point B refunds the difference between the LMPs 
at B and A. Hence, if a unit at A holds an FTR from A to B for 100 MW, then the unit can deliver energy 
to B at a rate of 100 MW and be guaranteed the price at B. Alternatively, if the 100 MW represents a 
bilateral transaction, then the parties at A and B are able to negotiate a firm price unaffected by 
transmission congestion. 
Although improving price certainty may be desirable, there is a cost. Namely, the FTRs make the 
holders immune to the locational prices. If the entire grid capacity is allocated as FTRs, then the ISO loses 
                                                      
12 An exception is that some owners of transmission assets or grandfathered entitlements, such as municipal utilities, 
can opt whether to assign their capacity to the ISO for transmission management. If they choose not to do so, then 
the ISO accepts their schedules without any pricing of congestion. 
13 Hogan (1998).  Cramton and Wilson   Review of Market Rules 
   September  9,  1998 
  18
its ability to control the system with locational prices. Hence, if FTRs are used, quantities of FTRs should 
be limited to some fraction of the grid capacity. In this way, those negotiating bilateral transactions can 
obtain price certainty without sacrificing the security of the grid. 
Lastly, we mention a problem with transmission markets based on congestion prices. When usage 
charges are derived solely from the costs of alleviating congestion, traders can opt to “self-manage” 
congestion by curtailing their proposed transfers sufficiently to eliminate usage charges. This is unlikely 
at the level of a small individual trader unless charges are imposed at the level of injection nodes or 
particular links. But with large zones, market makers conducting exchanges or bilateral contracting that 
account for large fractions of transmission demand can self-manage in an explicit attempt to capture 
congestion rents.
14 The California design encourages self-management, and indeed there is no efficiency 
concern about who captures the rents provided congestion is alleviated one way or another. In contrast, 
efficiency in an optimized pool requires that all congestion rents are captured via usage charges. This 
depends on a naïve view of incentives and strategic behavior unless market power is so dispersed that 
price-taking prevails. More likely, the opportunity to capture congestion rents encourages concerted 
efforts to capture them.
15  
4.3  Incentives for new transmission capacity 
The incentives for new transmission capacity will play a critical role in determining the long run 
efficiency of the wholesale electricity market in New England. There is a strong conflict of interest 
between suppliers and demanders on this issue, as well as among suppliers.
16 Transmission congestion 
creates congestion rents. The specifics of the grid and the market rules impact how those rents are 
distributed among participants. Inevitably some parties will benefit from the status quo, and will lobby 
hard against changes to the grid. This is especially true of transmission expansion that would increase the 
contestability of the market from imports. For the electricity market to be efficient, it is essential that such 
lobbying efforts prove unsuccessful. At a minimum, new capacity should be added whenever its cost can 
be covered by a reduction in future congestion costs; more generally, capacity expansions need to take 
account of the inherent externalities that pervade transmission systems. Indeed, if there is a bias in these 
                                                      
14 This is not necessarily easy to do, since there is a significant free-rider problem engendered by each exchange’s 
preference that others bear the greater share of the burden in curtailing their aggregate transmission demands. The 
game is repeated daily, however, so implicit collusion is potentially feasible. 
15 Theoretical models as well as experimental and empirical results indicate that energy traders capture some portion 
of congestion rents. See footnote 4 and Weiss (1998a). 
16 The transmission cost sharing and planning mechanism that is being developed may resolve some of these 
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decisions it should be toward building excessive transmission capacity, since this capacity is essential in 
making the markets contestable. 
Resolving this issue is beyond the scope of this report. It is largely a governance issue,
17 and is not 
affected directly by the market rules. (One exception is the debate over uniform uplift charges or 
locational pricing of congestion. Locational pricing has the advantage that it makes the congestion costs 
transparent and therefore is likely to stimulate demand for new transmission capacity in the places where 
it is most needed, and to encourage siting of new generation capacity in locations enabling unconstrained 
exports.) We mention the issue because of its importance. It would be pointless to make a Herculean 
effort in fine-tuning the market rules if the goal of long run efficiency is undermined by poor governance 
rules. 
Recommendation: We doubt that uniform uplift will resolve congestion problems adequately. The 
ISO should begin investigating alternatives. Location-based pricing will increase short-run efficiency, 
and provide improved incentives for generation and transmission expansion. It may suffice in the short-
term to impose congestion charges only on the import/export interfaces of the New England system. 
5  Interaction between Energy and Reserve Markets 
In considering the interaction between the energy and the reserve markets, it is important to keep in 
mind that incentive effects are not eliminated by one market design or another; rather, the form in which 
they are expressed depends on the specific features of the market structure. The advantage of a superior 
design derives from the extent to which it enables traders to express accurately the economic 
considerations important to them. Gaming strategies are inherent in any design that requires traders to 
manipulate their bids in order to take account of factors that the bid format does not allow them to express 
directly. 
The bid format is a key factor. For example, if the market is organized to provide hourly schedules 
and prices, then this tends to serve the interests of demanders for whom the time of power delivery is 
important, and suppliers with flexibility (for example, storage hydro), whereas it tends to ignore the 
considerations of suppliers from thermal sources, who are mainly concerned with obtaining operating 
schedules over consecutive hours sufficient to recover the fixed costs of startup and who are unconcerned 
about timing per se. Schemes have been devised that allow demanders to bid on a time-of-day basis while 
suppliers bid for operating runs of various durations; prices can then be stated equivalently in terms of 
hourly prices for demanders and duration prices for suppliers. Similarly, for ancillary services it is usually 
important to distinguish between availability payments for reserving capacity and payments for delivered 
                                                      
17 See, for example, Barker, Tenenbaum, and Woolf (1997). Cramton and Wilson   Review of Market Rules 
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energy when called by the ISO. Schemes have also been devised to allow bids in terms of priorities or 
adjustments, such as demands that are curtailable above a specified real-time price. We bypass these more 
elaborate schemes here in order to focus on the basic problem of clearing an hourly market for firm 
energy, either forward or spot. 
A pool tries to eliminate inefficiencies by a centralized optimization based on submitted cost and 
engineering data, some of which is monitored for accuracy. The program allocates quantities subject to 
system constraints, but it also obtains shadow prices used for settlements. In principle, a dual formulation 
could be implemented as a single market with explicit prices determined by simultaneous clearing of the 
markets for each of the main ingredients, such as energy, transmission, and ancillary services. Several 
designs have been proposed for conducting these markets simultaneously, and at least one has received 
some experimental testing. In practice, however, these markets are usually conducted in a sequence 
reflecting the fact that demands for transmission are derived from energy transactions, and the supply is 
fixed. Similarly, the ISO’s demand for ancillary services is nearly proportional to the demand for energy, 
since most system operators maintain reserves on that basis, and the supply consists mostly of residual 
generation capacity after accounting for the main energy transactions. Thus, the typical structure is a 
cascade in which the initial market is for energy, followed by a transmission market in which energy 
flows are adjusted to keep within the transfer capacity, then a market for ancillary services such as 
spinning and non-spinning reserves (for which some transfer capacity was previously set aside). These 
forward markets on a day-ahead (and perhaps hour-ahead) basis are followed by a real-time market in 
which the ISO draws on supplementary offers to maintain system balancing on a short time scale, and 
when these are insufficient or expensive, calls on the ancillary services held in reserve. 
5.1  Do the rules promote intermarket efficiency? In particular, can energy and 
reserve markets be effectively unbundled? 
Ancillary services are especially sensitive to the bid format. Using spinning reserve as the example, 
it is clear that suppliers must be paid for capacity availability as well as energy generation. On this basis 
one might surmise that suppliers should bid both components, and then these two-part bids should be 
weighed together by the ISO in bid evaluation, but this causes problems. The initial problem is that the 
independent system operator must evaluate such two-part bids by giving some weight (interpreted as the 
probability or duration that spinning units will be called to produce) to the energy bid. But as in most 
multi-part bidding schemes, this is fraught with gaming problems; for example, a bidder who thinks that a 
call is less probable than the weight used by the ISO prefers to exaggerate the capacity bid and shrink the 
energy bid, and the opposite if a call is more probable. Thus the merit order of energy bids reveals less Cramton and Wilson   Review of Market Rules 
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about actual costs of generation than expectations about the likelihood that spinning reserves will be 
activated. 
These incentive problems are alleviated when different procedures are used for bid evaluation and 
settlements, as in California.
18 In the simplest scheme bids for reserves are accepted solely on the basis of 
the offered capacity price, and then settlements for energy generation are based on the system real-time 
energy price rather than the offered energy price.
19 That is, the offered energy price is interpreted only as 
a reserve price below which the supplier prefers not to be called. Thus, it provides a merit order for 
calling generation without distorting incentives. This scheme separates the competitive process into two 
parts corresponding to the two parts of the bid, one for capacity availability, and another for priority in 
being called to generate. The result is economic efficiency in both the energy and reserve markets, 
provided the markets are competitive. Bidders have the incentive to bid their marginal cost in the energy 
market, and their opportunity cost in the reserve market. Like California, the proposed market rules for 
New England also have this desirable structure. We return to this topic in Section 8. 
6  Revelation of Bidding Information 
In each of the electricity markets, an important question is: What bidding information should be 
revealed to the bidders, and when and how should it be revealed? Since the issues are similar across 
markets, we begin with a general discussion, but frame it in terms of the energy market to be concrete. 
We describe two extreme approaches, and then discuss a middle ground that is more apt to be appropriate 
for ISO New England. 
For any piece of information received or produced by the ISO, there are several options. 
1.  The ISO can reveal publicly the information (public information). 
2.  The ISO can reveal the information to all the bidders, but not the public. 
3.  The ISO can report the information to the specific bidder (bidder-specific information). 
4.  The ISO can report the information to no one (secret information). 
We do not give option 2 a name, since it is an option that can be dispensed with immediately. Any 
information that is revealed to all the bidders should be made public. The reason is that if it is useful 
information to the bidders it is useful information to a potential bidder. Since the ISO cannot know the set 
                                                      
18 Wilson (1998b). 
19 One qualification to this statement is that bids that would not be least cost for any real-time price are screened out 
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of potential bidders, the information should be made public. However, the decision among options 1, 3, 
and 4 is less obvious. 
At one extreme is a fully transparent process: reveal all bidding information to the public. This is the 
approach adopted by the FCC in its highly successful spectrum auctions. Before the auction begins the 
FCC posts the set of eligible bidders, the extent of each bidder’s eligibility, the bidder’s identity, and the 
bidder’s application form, which includes ownership and other financial information. During the auction, 
after each round of bidding, the FCC immediately posts all the bids for the round, the bidder that made 
each bid, and any changes in eligibility. This approach has three main advantages. First, it gives 
participants (and potential participants) the maximum amount of information. The bidders then can use 
this information in preparing subsequent bids. The information reduces the bidders’ uncertainty, which 
facilitates price discovery and improves efficiency. Moreover, it may increase auction revenues, since 
with less uncertainty the bidders can bid more aggressively, without fear of falling prey to the winner’s 
curse.
20 Second, it simplifies implementation. The information simply is posted on the Internet. The FCC 
need not worry about maintaining or delivering bidder-specific information. Nor does the FCC need to be 
concerned with establishing secure methods of preserving secret or bidder-specific information. Third, it 
means that the process is fully transparent. This permits the bidders and any other interested party to 
check that the auction is being conducted in compliance with the stated rules. If problems are discovered, 
they can be fixed quickly, before any serious damage is done. 
The difficulty with a fully transparent process, which prove critical in electricity markets, is that 
information is sometimes a two-edged sword. It can be used to facilitate explicit or implicit collusion, as 
well as promote efficiency. Information about the bidder identity associated with each bid is especially 
vulnerable to implicit collusive use. For example, a group of bidders can establish a collusive supply 
schedule, and then punish defections to the schedule. If bidder identities are known, then the punishment 
can be directed against the defector, by retaliating in particular hours or locations, so as to harm the 
defector the most. Alternatively, a small subset of bidders may be party to a tacit agreement. For example, 
only the three largest bidders may have a implicit collusive understanding. In this case, to enforce the 
collusive arrangement, it is important for the colluding bidders to know the bidder identities, so that 
deviations can be detected, and then punished. 
                                                      
20 The winner’s curse is the tendency for naïve auction winners to lose money, because they fail to take account of 
the information contained in winning a competitive auction. To avoid the winner’s curse, smart bidders shade their 
bids. The amount of shading depends in part on the amount of uncertainty the bidders face. See Milgrom and Weber 
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In a few of the FCC spectrum auctions, some bidders did take advantage of the fully transparent 
process to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid.
21 These 
bidding strategies may have helped these bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the 
proposed division by directed punishments. The FCC’s experience stands as a lesson that profit-motivated 
bidders in high-stake auctions take advantage of opportunities that are permitted by the rules. 
At the other extreme is a policy of complete secrecy. The ISO makes no disclosure of any 
information, aside from what is absolutely necessary—each bidder would only be told its settlement 
information. This approach would mitigate tacit collusion to the greatest extent. However, it exposes the 
bidders to the greatest uncertainties, and this may introduce inefficiencies. 
A middle ground is probably best. First, the secrecy of individual bids is essential for competition in 
this kind of market. The market is repeated daily and a few participants constitute the majority of supply. 
Such a setting is ripe for abuse if the parties are given the informational means. System-wide results 
should be public information: prices, total generation, total reserves, etc.
22 This information is either 
needed by bidders for planning or can be inferred from settlement information. Hence, it should be made 
public. The next step would be to make the aggregate bid schedules public. Bidders surely would like to 
have this information in preparing bids for the next day. It represents an indication of what would be the 
consequences of changing the quantity bid. However, the information is not essential for competition. A 
supplier, whose bid was rejected yesterday, knows that it needs to improve its bid tomorrow (assuming 
tomorrow is like today). Knowing the price elasticity of supply (or demand) is not essential to the 
analysis. Unless a strong argument can be made that knowing the price elasticity improves efficiency, it 
would seem prudent to keep the aggregate schedules secret and only reveal prices and aggregate 
quantities publicly. 
One argument in favor of revealing more information is that it may level the playing field. Each of 
the two largest bidders has knowledge of nearly one-half of the bids, and a combined bid knowledge of 
65% of the bids. In contrast, the other bidders know only a tiny fraction of the bids. One solution to this 
problem would be to introduce an information policy for co-owners on units for which they do not have 
bidding authority. For example, one could delay the release of bid information to non-lead co-owners 
until the end of the month. This would give the co-owners the information needed for oversight of the 
lead owner, but prevent the use of the information for daily strategic gain.
23 An alternative would be to 
make the aggregate bid schedules public information. 
                                                      
21 Cramton and Schwartz (1998a,b). 
22 The revelation of imports/exports, especially those in short notice, needs more careful analysis. 
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Recommendation: The risk of implicit collusion is sufficiently large to outweigh the efficiency gains 
of disclosing information beyond market prices and total quantities. 
7 Energy  Market 
In the next three sections we discuss market-specific issues raised by the proposed rules. We begin 
with the energy market. 
The proposed energy market is a single-settlement system, which is cleared ex post. Except for the 
case of out-of-merit dispatch, all suppliers receive the same energy price—the real-time spot price. This 
reliance on the spot price for all trades in the ISO energy market creates a strong incentive for suppliers to 
influence the spot price through actions taken after the day-ahead schedule is announced. If the spot 
market is thin, participants may be whipsawed by large price variations. Below we discuss the calculation 
of the energy clearing price and several other important issues in the energy market. 
7.1  Calculation of the energy clearing price 
Because so much is riding on it, the calculation of the energy clearing price (ECP) in a single-
settlement system is a frequent source of debate. In one view, the real-time spot price should be the 
marginal cost of producing an extra MWh of energy given the state of the system, whatever the costs of 
reaching that state. The alternative argument is that the ECP should be the bid of the marginal unit that is 
dispatched—that is, the highest accepted bid for the time period—taking account of ramping constraints 
then in effect. Practically, these alternative methods of calculating the energy clearing price (ECP) are 
implemented as follows: 
1.  Shadow price method. The ECP is the shadow price on the energy balance constraint from the 5-
minute dispatch LP.  
2.  Marginal unit method. The ECP is the most expensive MW from all dispatchable units, 
including any ramp-constrained units, that was actually dispatched to meet energy demand. 
The central issues are how intertemporal constraints are handled, and how gaming is to be prevented. 
If there are no intertemporal constraints, then the two methods yield the same outcome, both in pricing 
and dispatch. This would be the case if all units could respond flexibly in a 5-minute interval, so that 
ramping constraints were nonbinding. However, when ramping constraints are binding, the two 
approaches differ. 
Assume that participants bid their costs and that demand is known perfectly in advance, so that re-
dispatch to meet contingencies is unnecessary. Then the “correct” ECP is the shadow price on the energy 
balance constraint in each 5-minute interval from the scheduling LP over the full cycle (24 hours) with all Cramton and Wilson   Review of Market Rules 
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ramping constraints included.
24 Then the shadow price during a 5-minute peak includes the costs of 
previously ramping up and then later ramping down expensive units to meet the spike in demand. For 
practical reasons (e.g., uncertainty in demand), the proposed shadow price method uses the shadow price 
from the 5-minute dispatch LP. Hence, the LP is taking the initial state as given, and looking forward it 
takes demand predictions as accurate, ignoring the fact that units are in a particular state now as a result of 
prior optimization and that subsequent contingencies might require further alterations in the planned 
dispatch. The shadow prices are thus different from the ideal. However, we conjecture that over a daily 
cycle that is approximately repeated each day, the proposed shadow price approach simply displaces 
some payments from one hour to another, and is unbiased on average in that the payments summed over 
the full cycle will be the same as in the full-cycle LP.
25 In some hours the price will be too high (e.g., 
price in peak periods do not account for ramping costs incurred earlier and later) and in others too low, 
but these discrepancies from the ideal balance out over the daily cycle. This is the primary justification for 
the shadow price method. 
It should be understood that the distortions in the shadow price method, even if unbiased on average, 
are relevant to participants. In particular, how the distortions impact a participant may depend on how 
flexible the participant’s plants are. Different unbiased approaches may result in more or less variation in 
spot prices. Those participants with more flexible plants may be better able to take advantage of a more 
variable spot price, especially high prices in peak periods. A simulation study would be required to say 
much more about how different ECP calculations would impact participants. 
Recently, a “Compromise Proposal” has been discussed.
26 The compromise method expands the set 
of units eligible to set the ECP, but imposes two screens to mitigate risks of gaming. The method allows 
flexible units—those that are not ramp-rate constrained due to changes in their energy bid prices—to set 
the ECP. A unit is deemed flexible if its manual response rate (MRR) is not too low. A unit is deemed 
ramp-rate constrained due to changes in its energy bid price if (1) it is ramping down and its price 
schedule increased from the prior hour, or (2) it is ramping up and its price schedule decreases in the next 
hour. The flexibility screen is argued to prevent a bidder from strategically setting a low MRR. The 
                                                      
24 We are assuming (in the simplistic world without uncertainty) that the scheduling program breaks the 24-hour day 
into 5-minute intervals, and then solves the dynamic programming problem with all 5-minute ramping constraints 
included. This problem produces a shadow price on energy for each five minute interval that reflects intertemporal 
constraints. Of course, it is not practical to solve such a problem, so the unit commitment programs use 1 hour 
intervals. Also, demand and supply uncertainties make the day-ahead schedule only a rough approximation of what 
is required. 
25 A true optimization using LP under uncertainty (Dantzig, 1976) that includes contingent plans would provide fully 
correct pricing. However, it is presently seen as infeasible computationally. 
26 “Compromise Proposal for Determining the Real-Time Marginal Price of Energy,” June 1, 1998. Cramton and Wilson   Review of Market Rules 
   September  9,  1998 
  26
pricing screen is argued to prevent a bidder from strategically changing its bid schedule to affect the 
clearing price when ramp-rate constrained. Under the compromise proposal, the ECP is set at the higher 
of (a) the shadow price from the 5-minute dispatch LP and (b) the highest cost unit dispatched, including 
ramp-constrained flexible units that pass the pricing screen. 
This compromise adds complexity to the rules for price determination, and it may bias the ECP in an 
upward direction. The two screens, while intended to mitigate gaming, are ad hoc, and have the 
undesirable consequence of imposing two artificial constraints on the bidders. To the extent that these 
constraints distort bidding behavior, efficiency is compromised. For example, bidders may limit changes 
in their bid schedules across hours, despite changes in their marginal costs, so as to qualify to set the 
clearing price. 
The debate over the clearing price calculation highlights the weakness of a one-settlement system: 
too much is riding on the spot price. To the extent that parties transact through the ISO’s residual energy 
market, the spot price will determine all settlements, and thus participants may have strong incentives to 
distort their behavior in order to manipulate the spot price. Because the largest bidders have significant 
market shares, we anticipate that manipulation of the spot price will be an important issue. A full analysis 
of the various pricing methods would take into account how the pricing rule impacts the parties’ 
incentives to game the system. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this report. 
One consistent view of the scheduling-dispatch problem is as a day-ahead scheduling LP with 
uncertainty that is resolved at dispatch. Hourly shadow prices on the energy balance equation in the 
scheduling LP represent correct energy prices at the day-ahead point. Then the 5-minute dispatch LP 
(which is a contingent sub-problem of the larger scheduling LP), taking the state as given, produces the 
correct energy prices for deviations from the day-ahead schedule. Hence, a multi-settlement system in 
which prices from the scheduling LP are used for day-ahead transactions, and then prices from the real-
time dispatch are used for deviations from the day-ahead schedule will produce more accurate incentives. 
Notice that the shadow price and marginal unit approaches nearly coincide in the multi-settlement system: 
the day-ahead shadow price is the cost of the marginal unit at the time of commitment. To a large extent, 
the debate over shadow price methods vs. marginal unit methods is resolved in a multi-settlement system. 
The difficulty with the single-settlement approach is that one is asking the 5-minute dispatch LP to 
produce prices it is not designed to produce—prices that reflect the economic costs of committing a unit 
on a day-ahead basis to hourly service whose costs are dependent on the state of the system when 
contingencies must be addressed. Cramton and Wilson   Review of Market Rules 
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Recommendation: ISO New England should move to a multi-settlement system. Although it could 
not be implemented by December 1, its implementation is helped by the fact that the neighboring power 
markets in PJM and NY have adopted a multi-settlement system. 
7.2  Is the lack of demand-side bidding a serious flaw in the energy market? 
Demand-side bidding is required for full efficiency. Short-run efficiency requires demand-side 
bidding, and long-run efficiency requires incentives for investments in cost-effective price-sensitive 
demand reduction technologies. Technological advances in the next few years will increase the elasticity 
of short-run energy demand by enabling faster responses to price variations. Indeed, most of the 
efficiency gains in the long run are likely to come on the demand side rather than the supply side. 
Demand-side bidding is essential to obtain these potential efficiency gains. Demand-side bidding creates 
incentives for investing in power management technologies that economize on energy consumption in 
peak periods. Without demand-side bidding these innovations will be stifled. 
Market power mitigation is inherently more difficult when demand is treated as inelastic. A key 
result from experimental studies is that demand-side bidding is a powerful instrument in mitigating 
market power.
27 Investments in power management technologies to increase demand elasticity would 
limit supplier market power. This is likely to be as effective in reducing supplier market power as 
investments in new generating capacity. Of course, this is possible only if demand-side bidding is 
introduced. 
Finally, ISO operations are impaired when it must rely on predictions for its optimization 
procedures, and cannot use demand-side management options such as curtailments. Although curtailable 
loads are allowed under the proposed rules, demand-side bidding is a more flexible market mechanism to 
account for buyers’ sensitivity to price. 
One explanation offered for the absence of demand-side bidding is that allowing it would be overly 
complex. This explanation does not stand up to the fact that many electricity markets have successfully 
implemented demand-side bidding at reasonable cost. There is no reason not to allow demand-side 
bidding. Its absence is an artifact of the era of regulation, which focused on the supply side, taking the 
demand as given. 
Recommendation: Demand-side bidding should be introduced as soon as possible. The ISO should 
develop the rules and other steps needed for implementation, taking advantage of the experience of other 
markets, such as California. 
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7.3  Will the energy market be adversely impacted by short-notice external 
energy transactions in that purchases and sales without corresponding self-
schedule changes are allowed? 
Short-notice transactions together with ex post settlement will introduce opportunities for severe 
gaming. For example, a large bidder can bid in such a way that the supply schedule in the day-ahead 
market is steep at the clearing price. Then selling a large quantity to New York as a short-notice external 
transaction has a large price effect. Indeed, it gives other large bidders an incentive for similar external 
transactions. Since the market is repeated on a daily basis, and prices are fairly predictable, large bidders 
will likely learn the advantage of submitting steep supply schedules around the clearing price, and then 
driving the price high on all units using appropriate external transactions. Since these short-notice 
transactions can amount to 10% of the market or more, the price effect can be very large. 
On the other hand, such strategies would be mitigated by short-notice imports from New York, as 
traders take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. In this case, the short-notice transactions may work to 
make the New England market contestable. The critical elements in evaluating whether short-notice 
transactions will help or hurt competition are the rules and charges that govern use of the transmission 
capacity for imports and exports. FERC's open access order 888 mandates that this critical transmission 
capacity should be used efficiently to arbitrage price differences across markets. However, there still may 
be impediments to effective arbitrage. For example, if a large bidder in the New England market 
schedules imports from New York until the interconnection is constrained, and then makes a last minute 
short-notice export to New York, units in New York may have insufficient time to take advantage of the 
arbitrage opportunity. Such a strategy might work especially well if the neighboring market has 
predominately inflexible generation or internal transmission constraints (and corresponding usage 
charges) that are binding. 
The procedures for accepting short notice transactions can mitigate the problems they may cause.
28 
However, it would be impossible to develop workable administrative procedures that effectively 
differentiated between short-notice transactions motivated by desirable arbitrage and those motivated by 
strategic gaming.  
Recommendation: Adopting a multi-settlement system would eliminate the inherent gaming 
problems that short-notice transactions create. Under a single-settlement system, restrictions would need 
to be put in place to mitigate gaming. These restrictions would limit flexibility, creating new 
inefficiencies. Congestion pricing of import/export interfaces would improve the efficiency of their use. 
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7.4  Will a residual energy market establish a reliable spot market price for 
electricity? 
The two requirements for reliable prices are competition and liquidity. These two features usually go 
hand in hand. Both competition and liquidity may be an issue in New England. First, the two largest 
participants supply over half the market, ignoring imports. These are likely sufficient shares to influence 
prices at times of peak demand. The absence of demand-side bidding will accentuate any market power 
problems as described above. Second, liquidity may be a problem under the proposed design. There may 
be a strong incentive for participants to use bilateral transactions and to self-schedule. Bilateral 
transactions avoid risks associated with reliance on the spot prices, which are inherently volatile. This risk 
will be especially high if competition in the spot market is weak. Bilateral transactions also have the 
advantage to the parties that self-schedules can be made ignoring any transmission costs they impose on 
the system. Since transmission costs are borne on a proportionate basis via uplift charges, the parties to a 
bilateral transaction pay only a small fraction of the costs they impose on the system. In contrast, if the 
parties submitted bids into the ISO energy market, then their bids might be rejected, and out of merit bids 
accepted in their place due to transmission congestion. These factors provide incentives for bidders to 
avoid the ISO energy market by self-scheduling bilateral transactions. 
  On the other hand, bilateral transactions without self-scheduling do have one important advantage. 
The supplier can satisfy the demand via the ISO energy market if it is efficient to do so. For example, the 
parties can use a contract for differences to avoid the risk of an unreliable spot price, and still take 
advantage of the efficiency gains from not self-scheduling. In fact, an unreliable spot price increases the 
incentive to do so, since the gains from market arbitrage increase with the market’s volatility. This 
incentive provides a countervailing force that prevents the energy market from collapsing altogether. 
Still, on balance, the ISO's share of energy transactions is likely to fall to a tiny fraction. This has 
been the experience in other single-settlement systems, such as Victoria, where only about 5% of the 
system's energy is traded in the ISO’s market. As the share falls, the spot price may become unstable, and 
the ability of the ISO to control the system using market mechanisms may be compromised. In the worst 
case, the ISO is forced to use administrative procedures that are fraught with inefficiencies. Alternatively, 
the growth in the market for bilateral contracts or other commodity markets based on a market-clearing 
exchange may make the ISO market either unstable or irrelevant, as is the case of the government 
auctions for sulfur-dioxide allowances.
29 Instabilities in a tiny ISO energy market might be avoided 
through arbitrage from a secondary market. However, the prospect of transmission congestion could 
prevent this optimistic scenario from materializing. The self-scheduled transactions may prove infeasible, 
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and an ISO relying on uniform-uplift congestion pricing lacks the market mechanism to correct the 
problem.  
The absence of location-based congestion charges makes the decline of the ISO energy market 
likely. Private markets do not need to worry about transmission in uniform-uplift systems like New 
England, and the ISO handles all ancillary services, etc. We expect a dramatic expansion of private 
contracts and commodity markets, and a corresponding shrinkage of the role of the ISO itself, with 
resulting thinness and volatility of its real-time spot prices. However, these prices will become 
inconsequential if most trades are bilateral. The ISO likely would become a minimal-ISO engaged mainly 
in real-time balancing and ancillary services. These activities will become difficult as the percentage of 
self-scheduled transactions increases. 
Recommendation: The spot price is likely to be volatile, and possibly unreliable, in a single-
settlement system without congestion pricing of transmission. 
7.5  Does the lack of explicit start-up and no-load costs in the bidding mean that 
efficiency will be sacrificed? 
A peculiarity of some optimized pools is payment to suppliers for capacity in addition to energy, 
based on so-called multi-part bids that include components for both fixed costs and incremental energy 
costs, with compensating charges to demanders for “uplift.” These are not payments for capacity reserved 
for ancillary services but rather for planned generation. This holdover from the era of regulation is unique 
to the electricity industry, which is the only one that does not expect suppliers to cover fixed costs, such 
as capital and maintenance, from the market price of its output. Although a long-run equilibrium in the 
industry implies prices in peak periods adequate to cover the costs of capacity idle in other periods, the 
motive for these payments is apparently the short-run concern that market-clearing prices for energy will 
be determined by incremental generation costs that will be insufficient to recover the costs of capital and 
O&M. Such an outcome is mainly a consequence of reliance in optimized pools on shadow prices that 
reflect only purported incremental costs, based on a parallel optimization of unit commitments that takes 
account of start-up costs, ramping constraints, and minimum generation levels, as well as the uncertainty 
of demand and the imputed value of lost load.
30 Without elaborating fully here, we are skeptical of any 
such payment scheme that is not tied to explicit reservation of capacity, such as for ancillary services, 
because we see it as an open invitation for manipulation. Designs such as those in California, 
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Scandinavia, and Australia (and recently proposed for the revision of the U.K. system
31) dispense with 
these payments by clearing the market for energy entirely on the basis of prices offered for delivered 
energy, leaving scheduling decisions to suppliers. It might indeed be that prices in California will reflect 
only incremental costs that are insufficient to recover the O&M costs of installed units, but if so then that 
signals excess capacity that in the long run should be mothballed or decommissioned. In New England the 
markets for operable and installed capability may prevent this from happening, as efficiency would 
dictate. 
Recommendation: We believe that pure energy bids are all that is required for efficiency. The 
inclusion of start-up and no-load components, while sensible in a centrally planned system, are prone to 
gaming in a decentralized bidding environment. Bidders should be able to schedule their units reliably 
through pure energy bids. 
7.6  Is single-round bidding sufficient for economic efficiency? 
In energy markets there is a basic distinction between static and iterative market processes. In a static 
design for a pooled market each trader provides a single bid, usually in the form of a demand or supply 
function, with or without a separate capacity bid or a minimum revenue requirement, and perhaps in the 
form of a portfolio bid for multiple generation sources that is only later converted into unit schedules. The 
static character lies in the fact that the initial market clearing is also the final one. The theory underlying a 
static design is the Walrasian theory of markets, in which the market finds a price that equates stated 
demands and supplies. The mode of competition lies in each trader’s selection of the bid function it 
submits—which requires substantial guesswork since others’ bids are unknown when the submission is 
made. 
If the bids are purely for hourly energy then a static design can cause problems for suppliers with 
fixed costs and ramping constraints because the revenue may be insufficient to cover total costs. Designs 
of this sort therefore provide approximate remedies: the UK provides capacity payments, Spain allows 
suppliers to specify a minimum revenue requirement, and New England allows minimum run times. 
Without elaborating details here, our view is that these auxiliary provisions engender as many gaming 
problems as they solve, and in the case of capacity payments based on an assumed value of lost load, are 
inherently arbitrary.  
An iterative market process works quite differently, and reflects the Marshallian theory of markets. 
As in an auction with repeated bidding, it is those traders whose bids are at the margin who contend to get 
their bids accepted, and in each round they can base their bids on the tentative results from previous 
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rounds. For example, suppose that as usual a supplier’s bid is submitted as a series of steps at 
successively higher prices. In this case an “extra-marginal” supplier, one with a step above the market 
clearing price, realizes that by reducing its price for that step it can be more competitive in the next 
round—thereby ejecting an infra-marginal bidder who in the next round becomes extra-marginal and 
therefore must itself improve its offered price. Thus, Marshallian competition works by inducing 
competition among those bidders whose steps are actually near the margin, in contrast with Walrasian 
competition in which the price offered for each step must be based on a conjecture about the competitive 
situation in the event that step is at the margin.  
Iterative processes require procedural “activity” rules to ensure serious bidding throughout (and thus 
reliable price discovery) and to ensure speedy convergence, but they have the advantage of avoiding ad 
hoc measures to assure bidders’ fixed costs are covered.
32 In a day-ahead auction the key feature is that an 
iterative process enables “self-scheduling” in the sense that each supplier can adapt its offers in 
successive rounds to the observed pattern of hourly prices. With good information about the prices it can 
obtain in each hour, a supplier with steam plants can itself decide on which units to schedule, their start 
times, and their run lengths. Similarly, a supplier with storage hydro sources can better tailor its releases 
to take advantage of the observed prices in peak periods. In the California PX this enables pure-energy 
portfolio bidding: only after the energy market clears do the portfolio bidders need to report to the 
independent system operator their unit schedules that provide the energy they sold. Instead of the detailed 
operating data required by the UK’s static pool to run its centralized optimization program, California’s 
decentralized design assigns authority to the suppliers to schedule their own units to meet the 
commitments contracted in the energy market. 
These considerations are not unique to the operation of markets organized as exchanges with an 
hourly market clearing price that applies uniformly to all trades. Most markets for bilateral trades allow a 
dynamic process in which bid and ask prices are posted continually, and any posted offer can be accepted 
at its offered price at any time. As in an exchange using an iterative market clearing process, traders can 
monitor the posted prices and the prices of completed transactions to obtain good information about the 
prevailing pattern of prices. And because the contracts are bilateral, each party can set its own schedule to 
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fulfill the bargain. There are also designs for bilateral markets in which all contracts are tentative until the 
market clears, and then the same hourly prices apply to all completed transactions.
33  
Although some of the advantages of iterative bidding are clear, there are special features of the 
energy market that may make iterative bidding unnecessary or impractical. An energy auction must be 
conducted quickly. It would be impractical for the bidding to last more than an hour or two, which allows 
only a few rounds of bidding. The repeated nature of the energy auction also makes iterative bidding less 
essential. If inefficiencies are discovered one day, they can be corrected in the bidding for the next day. 
The daily repetition of the energy auction provides much of the benefits of learning during an iterative 
process. Inefficiencies may occur, especially in response to unexpected demand or supply shocks, but 
they may be corrected the next day.  
The California PX has been working fine without iterative bidding since it began on March 31, 1998. 
Although the California market was designed with iterative bidding, this format will not be introduced 
until late 1998, due in part to delays in software implementation. California participants view the absence 
of iterative bidding as of secondary importance. Their view is that the multi-settlement design gives them 
ample opportunity to resolve inefficiencies. If a unit goes unscheduled in one hour but is scheduled in the 
adjacent hours, then the unit can bid the missing hour in the hour-ahead market. If it still remains 
unscheduled, it can bid the missing hour in the real-time balancing market. Hence, the 3-settlement 
system gives the bidders additional opportunities to make adjustments (hour-ahead and spot markets), 
which mitigates the need for iterative bidding. New England's proposed single-settlement system gives 
the bidders fewer opportunities to correct problems, so a stronger case for iterative bidding can be made 
in New England. 
Recommendation: If a multi-settlement system is adopted, bidders will have opportunities to correct 
scheduling infeasibilities and inefficiencies. In this case, iterative bidding in the energy market is 
probably unnecessary. 
8 Ancillary  Services 
The argument is occasionally made that an energy exchange might as well augment each demand bid 
by the required proportion of ancillary services, or at least spinning reserve—just as is typically done for 
transmission losses.
34 This argument recognizes that on the demand side spinning reserve is a necessary 
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complement to planned energy deliveries. It is mistaken, however, because on the supply side energy and 
spin are largely substitutes, not complements. Moreover, technologies differ considerably in their 
characteristics for spinning reserve; for example, storage hydro sources and fast-start turbines are not 
subject to the ramping constraints and no-load costs of steam plants, but on the other hand, thermal plants 
can provide spinning reserve by operating below capacity. It is better therefore to establish a separate 
market for spinning reserves (and curtailable loads) along with other ancillary services so that these 
differing characteristics can be reflected in bids. 
Unlike the energy market, where payments are made for deliveries, payments for ancillary services 
are based on scheduled reserves of capacity, which may or may not be called for energy generation. As a 
result, sufficient monitoring and penalties for nonperformance are critical to assuring that the scheduled 
ancillary services are actually available when called. These issues are addressed in rules 13 and 14. In this 
section, we will assume that the monitoring and enforcement is sufficient to make the bids in these 
markets credible. 
8.1  Pricing of Ancillary Services 
The pricing of ancillary services specified in the NEPOOL Market Rules and Procedures, Section 6, 
is the most unusual feature of ISO New England’s proposed pricing structure.
35 We have serious 
reservations that are described below. 
It will suffice here to consider a thermal unit reduced from its high operating limit (HOL) to provide 
TMSR.
36 Unlike a hydro unit that can submit a positive bid for reserving capacity for TMSR, a thermal 
unit’s bid is deemed to be zero. Its payment per hour for each MW of capacity reserved for TMSR is 
essentially 
2 × Max{ 0 , Estimated Spot Price for Energy − Submitted Bid Price for Energy }, 
and in addition it receives the actual spot price for energy produced if and when it is called for TMSR 
generation in real time. This reservation payment has several peculiar features: 
  The estimated spot price is based on an optimization that ignores the requirements for ancillary 
services, so it presumes that the cost of the marginal generator is the same with and without set-asides 
for ancillary services. 
  The factor 2 represents the fact that nearly the same payment is calculated twice.  
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1.  A de facto bid is calculated as the lost opportunity cost, interpreted as the unit’s foregone profit 
from running below its HOL. This profit is calculated as the difference (if positive) between the 
estimated spot price and the unit’s bid price. 
2.  This cost is then computed again, but using the bid-in cost of the “next least expensive MW 
dispatched” in place of the estimated spot price, and again credited to the unit as an estimated 
“production cost change.” 
The de facto bid (1) might be an appropriate compensation for reserving capacity for TMSR. Indeed, 
if no formula payment were provided in the rules, then this is approximately what the unit’s owner would 
want to bid for reserving capacity for TMSR, since it represents the profit foregone from not selling 
generation in the energy market. The de facto bid is actually only an upper bound on this foregone profit, 
however, since in fact the unit may also earn additional profit if it is called for TMSR generation, for 
which it is compensated at the spot price. 
On the other hand, the “production cost change” (2) is a misnomer, since it bears no relation to any 
actual change in production costs. It might be considered a subsidy for standing ready to ramp up if 
called, but otherwise we are at a loss to see its motivation. 
The net effect of this double counting is that the TMSR selling price includes (besides the actual bid 
if the unit is hydro) the real-time price twice, once as a component of the lost opportunity payment, and 
again as part of the lost opportunity clearing price. 
We see no economic justification for the inclusion of both the lost opportunity cost and the so-called 
production cost change. If we are correct in our reading of the procedural rules, then the net effect is that 
for reserving capacity for TMSR a thermal unit is deemed by the formula to have bid twice an estimate of 
what it foregoes by not selling generation directly in the energy market.  
Since we are unfamiliar with the origins of this payment formula we must rely on some guesswork at 
this stage. The basic problem seems to arise from the fact that a thermal unit submits only a bid for energy 
generation. Because the ISO then selects some units for TMSR it must provide compensation for forcing 
the unit to operate below its HOL or desired dispatch point. This compensation is bounded above by the 
difference between an appropriate estimate of the spot price and the unit’s bid price—if in fact it is not 
subsequently called for generation. The true compensation required is this upper bound less the profit 
from generation when actually called. If this interpretation is correct then it appears that the bonus or 
subsidy provided TMSR units for standing ready is the sum of the production cost change and any profits 
subsequently earned when called to generate. 
The compensation for reserving capacity for TMSR that is used by other ISOs is considerably 
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unit-specific payments. For example, California pays the spot price for energy generated just as does ISO 
New England, but for the capacity reservation it pays only the highest bid among those selected, and 
rather than a de facto bid the unit’s actual bid is used for the selection. In particular, this enables the 
bidder to make its own estimate of both the foregone profit from direct energy sales, less the expected 
profit in real time from called generation. It should also be mentioned that most systems do not 
experience a shortage of resources for TMSR since in any case those units whose capacity is not fully 
sold in the energy market are available, and their opportunity cost is by definition zero. 
Double counting can potentially produce significant price distortions. It appears optimal to underbid 
a unit’s marginal cost of generation near the HOL so as to increase both the opportunity cost and the 
production change cost components. This risks being excluded from the TMSR selection, and lowers the 
estimated spot price, but these risks can be more than compensated by the double counting. 
Why hydro can bid but thermal cannot is unexplained, but one can surmise that hydro is being 
allowed the option to opt out of the selection for TMSR dispatch (by pricing itself out of the market) 
because of operating or intertemporal constraints, or total-energy constraints, but it is peculiar because 
most systems think of storage hydro as ideal for TMSR. Note too that thermal units sufficiently below 
HOL receive no opportunity cost payment. 
Recommendation: The TMSR pricing should be greatly simplified. At the very least, the double-
counting should be eliminated. A preferred approach would be to let all capable resources bid for TMSR 
and let the bid reflect any opportunity cost in this or other energy markets. 
8.2  Unbundling Energy and Reserves 
The unbundling of energy and reserves need not be a source of inefficiency. Efficiency is attained by 
separating the markets as follows: The reserve bids are used to determine which capacity reservations are 
accepted. Reserve bids are accepted in the merit order determined by their capacity prices, up to the total 
required by the ISO. All accepted offers are paid the market clearing capacity reserve price (the highest 
accepted bid). Then the energy bids determine which units provide energy. Energy bids are accepted in 
merit order, and bidders are paid the real-time spot energy price for any energy delivered. 
The efficiency of such a system may seem counterintuitive, since it makes no effort to optimize 
jointly the energy and reserve markets. However, it is precisely this joint optimization—selecting energy 
and reserve resources to minimize total system costs—that creates the incentives for bidders to distort 
their bids, undermining efficiency. With efficient pricing, the only joint optimizing feature is to screen out 
bid pairs that are never cost minimizing. Cramton and Wilson   Review of Market Rules 
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This approach is extended easily to the practical setting with multiple reserve options. These 
options—TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR—should be thought of as a cascade of options the ISO draws on 
to cap the spot energy price. Bids rejected for one service, say spinning reserve, can be carried over to 
compete for another service, such as non-spinning or operating reserve. In addition, the ISO should set the 
demands for these services based on the submitted schedules. For instance, because TMSR is superior to, 
and can substitute for, TMNSR, the ISO should purchase TMSR rather than TMNSR up to the point that 
TMSR becomes more expensive to meet the need for non-spinning reserve. In general, each superior-
quality service should be allowed to substitute for inferior qualities whenever it is cheaper. In this way, 
the clearing price in each market will reflect the quality of service: the clearing price for TMSR will be at 
least as great as that for TMNSR, which will be at least as great as that for TMOR.  
Recommendation: Demands for ancillary services should be set in response to the submitted 
schedules. In particular, the ISO should select the percentages of spin, non-spin, and operating reserves 
optimally to take advantage of the offered bids. In this way prices decrease in the sequence of reserves, 
reflecting the quality of the service. 
9 Capacity  Markets 
In principle, the installed capability and the operable capability markets are unnecessary in a 
competitive electricity market. Under competition, capacity is determined over the long term by the 
market in response to price expectations. If expectations are correct, then sufficient capacity is built so 
that the market prices just cover all costs including a risk-adjusted return on capital investments. If 
expectations are incorrect, then prices will be high, prompting additional investment in capacity, or low, 
prompting curtailed investment in capacity.
37 
The capacity markets are a holdover from the regulated setting, when capacity decisions were not 
made in response to price expectations. In the transition to a competitive market, the capacity markets 
may serve a useful role in coordinating investments in capacity. However, once competitive electricity 
markets are established in New England, it would be appropriate for the capacity markets to terminate. 
One possible advantage of the operable capability market is that it may reduce price peaks by 
facilitating the coordination of maintenance schedules. However, it does nothing to prevent strategic 
quantity reduction by suppliers, since a supplier can make “operable” capacity inoperable by submitting a 
sufficiently high energy bid. Unless there are constraints on energy bids, the operable capacity market 
                                                      
37 The fact that proposals totaling 25,000 MW of new generation were received before the capacity markets were 
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does little to prevent price peaks caused by suppliers withholding quantity. However, it may discourage 
suppliers from scheduling maintenance at peak times or the same times. 
Despite any advantages the capacity markets may have in transition, it may be best to eliminate them 
before the December 1
st start date. The reason is that once these markets are established there will be 
parties that benefit from them at the expense of other participants. For example, incumbent suppliers may 
want capacity requirements to continue so that they receive payments for obsolete plants that they would 
otherwise decommission, to be replaced by new more efficient plants. These parties will lobby for the 
status quo, and organizational inertia may mean that the capacity markets last well beyond any usefulness 
in transition. The costs from having the capacity markets are increased complexity, and distortions in 
investment decisions. Capacity costs should be recovered through prices in the energy and reserve 
markets, and not as part of an artificial market created by administrative regulations. 
Since the installed capability market is a monthly market and the stakes are high, it may make sense 
to allow iterative bidding. An iterative market has many advantages—most importantly a more reliable 
process of price determination. Bidders are able to respond to tentative price information in the prior 
rounds. Uncertainty is reduced, which encourages a more efficient outcome.  
 An iterative auction could be conducted in a few hours on the last day of each month. Internet-based 
auction software, which is available now, could be customized to this auction market. This would allow 
bidders to participate from their corporate headquarters (or any other location worldwide). 
To implement iterative bidding two additional changes would be needed. First, demand-side bidding 
would be introduced. And second, the ex post settlement would be replaced by a two-settlement system. 
The auction on the last day of the month would determine the market clearing price for installed 
capability based on the bids and offers in an iterative process. To the extent that there are deviations ex 
post, then the deviations are priced according to incs and decs specified by the suppliers. These changes 
would be needed to have a meaningful price discovery process with iterative bidding. 
Recommendation: The ISO should consider eliminating the installed capability market and the 
operable capability market. Incentives for sufficient capacity are provided by the energy and reserve 
markets. If the installed capability market is retained, consider switching to iterative bidding. 
10 Conclusion 
We believe that the wholesale electricity market in New England can begin on December 1, 1998. 
However, improvements are needed for long-run success. We have identified four major 
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  Introduce demand-side bidding. 
  Adopt location-based transmission congestion pricing, especially for the import/export 
interfaces. 
  Fix the pricing of the ten minute spinning reserves. 
Of these, only the final (and least important) recommendation could be implemented by the 
December 1
st start date. We do not view this as a fatal problem, provided that by the start date the ISO 
and NEPOOL reach agreement in principle on these basic concepts and a tentative timetable for 
implementation. We believe that if the markets open without any sense of what improvements will be 
made or when they will be made, then it will be much more difficult to adopt and implement needed 
improvements. An evolutionary “wait and see” approach would be too slow, and likely would result in 
damage to the markets that is difficult to correct. 
Our examination of the architecture of wholesale electricity markets in New England presumes that 
the ingredients for effective competition are present. It is important to emphasize further that market 
architecture is distinctly secondary in importance to market structure, in the sense of competitiveness or 
contestability. Monopoly power in generation, or local monopolies due to transmission constraints, can 
impair efficiency regardless of the market design implemented. Oligopolies are inherently more damaging 
to the public interest in wholesale electricity markets because their daily interaction offers ample 
opportunities for punishment strategies to police collusive arrangements, whether explicit or implicit. 
Thus, structural solutions to the market power of dominant incumbents often are important. How much 
competition is enough is a difficult empirical question. The ISO’s plans for market monitoring are an 
essential element to resolving this question in New England. 
In the same way, procedural rules are less important than architecture: no amount of fiddling with 
procedural rules can overcome major deficiencies in the links among the energy, transmission, and 
ancillary services markets. There is therefore a natural priority in the design process that starts with 
ensuring a competitive market structure, proceeds to the selection of the main market forums, and then 
concludes with the detailed issues of governance and procedures. Some procedural rules, of course, must 
be designed to mitigate market power and prevent collusion; for example, it is usual to maintain the 
secrecy of submitted bids to thwart efforts by a collusive coalition to punish deviants. 
An aspect omitted here is the role of transaction costs. This consideration affects all three stages of 
the design process. Procedural rules must obviously be designed to avoid unnecessary transaction costs, 
but it is well to realize too that a complex array of decentralized markets imposes burdens on traders, who 
may well prefer a simpler structure that avoids managing a complex portfolio of contracts, bids, and 
schedules. A simple design can also promote competition by bringing all traders together in a few markets Cramton and Wilson   Review of Market Rules 
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with standardized contracts, bid formats, and trading procedures. The virtues of simplicity should be kept 
in mind as the market rules are refined. Simple rules encourage participation; whereas, complex rules 
stand as a barrier to entry. 
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